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Hernandez v. State, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. 83 (Oct. 30, 2008)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – HABEAS CORPUS 
 
Summary 
 
 Appeal from a district court order denying Defendant’s post-conviction petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus in a capital case. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Affirmed the district court order denying post-conviction relief. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 On October 6, 1999, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Officer David Swoboda pulled over 
Fernando Navarro Hernandez for speeding.  Hernandez climbed out of his car, crying, and 
Officer Swoboda noticed that Hernandez had cuts on his hands and face.  Hernandez’s and 
Donna’s daughter Ana was also in the car.  When Officer Swoboda asked Hernandez what was 
wrong, Hernandez said he had been in a fight with his ex-wife.  Officer Swoboda then learned 
that Hernandez’s ex-wife, Donna, had taken out a protective order against Hernandez.  Officer 
Swoboda requested officers be sent to Donna’s home. 
 When officers arrived at Donna’s home, they found Donna’s body on the stairs.  A later 
autopsy showed that Donna had been strangled to death, both by hand and by placing an object – 
a foot or a knife – against her throat.  Donna also suffered from stab and slash wounds as well as 
blunt force head trauma.  A dinner knife had been thrust into her vagina, perforating the vaginal 
wall and penetrating Donna’s abdominal cavity, although this had apparently occurred 
postmortem.  Officers found nearby a seven-inch serrated knife, its handle broken off.  
Hernandez’s palm print was found on the broken knife.  Hernandez’s and Donna’s DNA was 
found in the blood at the crime scene, as well as in the blood on Ana’s pajamas when Hernandez 
was taken into custody, and on a ring Hernandez was wearing. 
 The district court convicted Hernandez of first-degree murder, burglary while in 
possession of a weapon, second-degree kidnapping, and unlawful sexual penetration of a dead 
body.  The jury did not specify which theory or theories the jury relied on in finding Hernandez 
guilty of first-degree murder.  The jury found three aggravating circumstances in support of a 
death sentence and seven mitigating circumstances.  The aggravating circumstances were: (1) the 
nonconsensual sexual penetration, (2) commission of the crime during a burglary, and (3) that 
the murder involved torture or mutilation; the mitigating circumstances were (1) Hernandez’s 
lack of a criminal history, (2) commission of the crime while under extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance, (3) Hernandez’s accepting responsibility for the crime, (4) Hernandez’s expression 
of remorse, (5) Hernandez’s intoxication during commission of the crime, (6) Hernandez’s 
constant employment throughout his adult life, and (7) that he had spared Ana’s life even though 
he had threatened to kill her.  
                                                 
1 By Julian R. Gregory. 
The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence on 
direct appeal.  Hernandez filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the 
district court denied following an evidentiary hearing.  This appeal followed. 
 
Discussion 
 
Aggravating conditions 
 
Hernandez put forward the argument that McConnell v. State2 invalidates the aggravating 
circumstances of burglary and torture.  In McConnell, the Supreme Court of Nevada held 
unconstitutional any case where the court saw fit “to base an aggravating circumstances in a 
capital prosecution on the felony upon which a felony murder is predicated.”3  In Bejarano v. 
State, the court applied McConnell retroactively.4  The court, therefore, held that the burglary 
aggravating circumstance was invalidated by the McConnell rule. 
The court came to the conclusion “that the United States and Nevada Constitutions 
require a capital sentencing scheme to ‘genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the 
death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the 
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.’”5  This may be done by the legislature in 
one of two ways: narrowing the definition of capital offenses, or broadly defining capital 
offenses and providing for narrowing by jury findings of aggravating circumstances at the 
penalty phase.6  To that end, McConnell put forward a two-part test: “‘First, is Nevada’s 
definition of capital felony murder narrow enough that no further narrowing of death eligibility is 
needed once the defendant is convicted?  Second, if not, does the felony aggravator sufficiently 
narrow death eligibility to reasonably justify the imposition of a death sentence on the 
defendant?’”7 
Torture murder in Nevada includes only those defendants “who act with calculated intent 
to inflict pain for revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose and to inflict pain 
beyond the killing itself.”8  The court here decided that Nevada’s definition of torture murder is 
sufficiently narrow as to avoid any unconstitutionality, and that no further narrowing of death 
eligibility is necessary.  Furthermore, the court clarified its holding in McConnell: there, the 
court held that because Nevada’s felony-murder statute did not require a defendant to have intent 
to kill, the statute was too broad and did not provide sufficient narrowing.9  Torture murder, the 
court reasons, includes an intent element in that malice must still be proven.10 
The court chose to reweigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence, asking “whether it is 
‘clear that absent the erroneous aggravator the jury would have imposed death.’”11  The court 
                                                 
2 120 Nev. 1043, 102 P.3d 606 (2004). 
3 Id. at 1069, 102 P.3d at 624. 
4 122 Nev. 1066, 146 P.3d 265 (2006). 
5 Hernandez v. State, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. 83 at 5 (Oct. 30, 2008) (quoting McConnell, 120 Nev. at 1063, 102 P.3d at 
620-21). 
6 Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988). 
7 Hernandez, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. 83 at 6 (quoting McConnell, 120 Nev. at 1065, 102 P.3d at 621-22). 
8 Id. (citing Dominguez v. State, 112 Nev. 683, 702 n.6, 917 P.2d 1364, 1377 n.6 (1996)). 
9 McConnell v. State, 120 Nev. 1043, 1065-66, 102 P.3d 606, 622 (2004). 
10 See Collman v. State, 116 Nev. 687, 714-15, 7 P.3d 426, 443-44 (2000); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.020 (2007). 
11 Browning v. State, 120 Nev. 347, 364, 91 P.3d 39, 51 (2004). 
determined that, even absent the aggravating condition of having committed the crime during a 
robbery, the jury would have found Hernandez eligible for the death penalty.12 
 
Ineffective assistance of counsel 
 
 Hernandez claimed that he had ineffective assistance of counsel, both trial and appellate.  
To determine ineffective assistance of counsel, the court relies on the two-prong test delineated 
in Strickland v. Washington.13  The burden is on the petitioner to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence14 that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient to the point that it was not objectively 
reasonable, and (2) the petitioner was prejudiced because counsel’s errors rendered the jury 
verdict unreliable.15  Hernandez also argued that United States v. Cronic16 created a presumption 
of prejudice, and that he need only show that counsel’s performance was not reasonable. 
 In Cronic, the United States Supreme Court held that there is a presumption of prejudice 
when “counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial 
testing.”17  The Nevada Supreme Court rejected Hernandez’s argument because the record 
showed that Hernandez’s counsel had filed several pretrial motions and that at least some of 
them were successful. 
 The court recognized that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a mixed question 
of fact and law subject in part to independent review, but gave deference to the purely factual 
findings of the district court.18 
First, Hernandez claimed that his counsel were ineffective because they failed to address 
whether Miranda v. Arizona19 barred admission of his statement to police officers when he was 
arrested.20  The court held that this argument lacks merit because Hernandez was not in custody 
at the time he made those statements, and Miranda affects only statements made during “in-
custody interrogation.”21 
Second, Hernandez claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for conceding 
Hernandez’s culpability without obtaining his consent.  Hernandez relied on Jones v. State, 
where the Nevada Supreme Court decided that counsel was ineffective for conceding guilt 
during the penalty phase of a second-degree murder case without the defendant’s consent.22  The 
court in the case at bar noted that Jones applies only where counsel concedes guilt despite the 
client’s testimonial denial of guilt during the guilt phase of the trial, and so determined that 
Hernandez’s argument lacks merit.23 
                                                 
12 The court relied on the brutality of the murder, including the fact that Donna was strangled, the stab wounds near 
Donna’s heart and in her neck, and the dinner knife found in Donna’s vagina.  
13 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
14 Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). 
15 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
16 466 U.S. 648 (1984). 
17 Id. at 659. 
18 Riley v. State, 110 Nev. 638, 647, 878 P.2d 272, 278 (1994). 
19 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
20 When Officer Swoboda pulled Hernandez over, he asked Hernandez what happened, to which Hernandez replied 
“I killed her” and “I killed them.” 
21 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445. 
22 110 Nev. 730, 855 P.2d 1052 (1994). 
23 The court noted that Hernandez met with counsel in chambers, without the prosecution, to discuss counsel’s 
decision to concede culpability to second-degree murder in attempt to avoid a first-degree murder charge, and that 
the trial judge twice asked Hernandez if he understood the ramifications of conceding to second-degree murder, and 
Third, Hernandez argues “that counsel were ineffective for failing to adequately 
communicate with him and investigate his case.”24  Hernandez claimed that counsel failed to 
consult experts and explore mitigation evidence, including Hernandez’s childhood and mental 
and psychological condition, and for not calling a neuropsychologist retained by the defense.  
Because Hernandez failed to explain how this evidence would have helped him, and because 
counsel testified that they had visit Hernandez and spent several hours with him, the court 
decided that the district court did not err in denying this claim. 
Fourth, Hernandez alleges that counsel were ineffective for failure to challenge his 
competency to stand trial.  Co-counsel testified that the neuropsychologist’s testimony would 
have been more harmful than helpful: while the expert opined that Hernandez was unable to 
reason properly and was suffering from profound emotional turmoil, Hernandez was also 
deceptive, denied culpability, and had no mental or psychological health issues.  Because 
Hernandez could not show that he was “not of sufficient mentality to be able to understand the 
nature of the criminal charges against him,”25 the court determined that the district court did not 
err in denying this claim. 
Fifth, Hernandez claims that counsel were ineffective for failing to seek a change of 
venue in light of the publicity surrounding his case.  Counsel testified that that the defense was 
able to seat twelve jurors who were not influenced by the publicity, and the record did not show 
that the publicity was so intense that the jury was impartial.  Therefore, the court concluded, the 
district court did not err. 
Sixth, Hernandez argues that the voluntary intoxication jury instruction was 
unconstitutionally overbroad, and that counsel was ineffective for not challenging it.26  On direct 
appeal, the court determined that the instruction was not plainly erroneous, even if it was too 
broadly stated.27  Because Hernandez failed to establish that this instruction was “intrinsically 
incorrect or unconstitutionally overbroad,”28 the court determined that Hernandez failed to show 
ineffectiveness of counsel. 
Seventh, Hernandez made several other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: 
. . . for failing to file motions to: (1) challenge the racial 
composition of the jury venire, (2) challenge matters related to the 
questioning of jurors during voir dire, (3) bifurcate the penalty 
hearing, (4) dismiss the notice of intent to seek the death penalty 
because probable cause for the aggravating circumstances was not 
established at the preliminary hearing and the aggravating 
circumstances were not charged in the information, (5) exclude 
evidence of uncharged misconduct, (6) seek exclusion of hearsay 
                                                                                                                                                             
that each time Hernandez responded that he understood.  This satisfies the requirements that the court adopted in this 
case: (1) the district court must canvass the defendant outside of the presence of the State, (2) the district court must 
ensure and make findings in the trial record that the defendant understands the strategy behind conceding guilt, and 
(3) the district court must inform the defendant that conceding guilt relieves the State of its burden to prove the 
offense. 
24 Hernandez v. State, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. 83 at 17 (Oct 30, 2008). 
25 Hill v. State, 114 Nev. 169, 176, 953 P.2d 1077, 1082 (1998) (internal quotation and citations omitted). 
26 The district court issued the instruction: “[i]f a person premeditates and deliberates upon the crime of Murder and 
forms a specific intent to commit that crime and thereafter becomes intoxicated, then such intoxication will not serve 
as a defense in order to reduce the degree of the murder.”  Hernandez, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. 83 at 20-21. 
27 Hernandez v. State, 118 Nev. 513, 527, 50 P.3d 1100, 1110 (2002). 
28 Hernandez, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. 83 at 22. 
statements, (7) compel compliance with Brady v. Maryland,29 (8) 
prohibit the use of a vague deadly weapon enhancement 
instruction, . . . (9) dismiss the deadly weapon enhancement as 
unconstitutionally vague. . . . [(10)] dismiss the notice of intent to 
seek the death penalty because Nevada’s death penalty scheme 
does not narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, 
[(11)] preclude prosecutorial misconduct, and [(12)] dismiss the 
kidnapping charge as legally and factually impossible. 
 Among these, Hernandez also argued that counsel failed to ensure proper recording of 
bench conferences and that the constitutional evidentiary standards and legal procedures 
regarding the admission of DNA evidence were adhered to.  The court determined that 
Hernandez did not provide adequate facts or argument that Hernandez therefore failed to 
demonstrate prejudice, and categorically denied that the district court erred with regard to any of 
these claims.30 
 Eighth, Hernandez claimed that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 
issues that Hernandez had requested be raised.  Because Hernandez neglected to specify 
additional issues he would have liked to have raised, and because appellate counsel testified that 
she excluded claims less likely to succeed in an effort to reduce page length, the court 
determined that the district court did not err in dismissing this claim. 
 
Concurring or Dissenting Opinions 
 
CHERRY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
 
 Justice Cherry concurred that the burglary aggravating circumstance should be stricken in 
accordance with McConnell v. State, that the district court did not err in denying Hernandez’s 
post-conviction claims for relief, and that McConnell does not invalidate the torture aggravating 
circumstance.  Justice Cherry departed from the majority because it was his opinion that the 
evidence in support of the remaining aggravated circumstances was not persuasive enough for 
the Justice to conclude that the jury would have found Hernandez eligible for the death penalty. 
Based on the compelling mitigating evidence, including character testimony by friends 
and co-workers, Hernandez’s high blood alcohol level at the time of his arrest, and displays of 
remorse on the part of Hernandez, Justice Cherry would elect to vacate the death sentence and 
remand the case to the district court for a new penalty hearing. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Supreme Court of Nevada held “that Nevada’s definition of torture murder 
sufficiently narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty,”31 and therefore is not 
invalidated by McConnell.  However, the court decided that the burglary aggravating 
circumstance is not sufficiently narrow, and therefore the court was required to strike it.  Despite 
the lack of one of the three aggravating circumstances, the court determined that the jury would 
                                                 
29 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
30 The court also noted that it concluded on direct appeal that the underlying issues in claims 10, 11 and 12 lacked 
merit.  Hernandez, 118 Nev. at 524-26, 534-35, 50 P.3d at 1107-09, 1115. 
31 Hernandez v. State, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. 83 at 24 (Oct. 30, 2008). 
have found Hernandez eligible for the death penalty and imposed a death sentence.  Lastly, the 
court determined that the district court did not err in denying Hernandez’s post-conviction 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
